Over the past two decades, several consistent procedures have been designed to infer causal conclusions from observational data. We prove that if the true causal network might be an arbitrary, linear Gaussian network or a discrete Bayes network, then every unambiguous causal conclusion produced by a consistent method from non-experimental data is subject to reversal as the sample size increases any finite number of times. That result, called the causal flipping theorem, extends prior results to the effect that causal discovery (...) cannot be reliable on a given sample size. We argue that since repeated flipping of causal conclusions is unavoidable in principle for consistent methods, the best possible discovery methods are consistent methods that retract their earlier conclusions no more than necessary. A series of simulations of various methods across a wide range of sample sizes illustrates concretely both the theorem and the principle of comparing methods in terms of retractions. (shrink)

Ockham’s razor is the principle that, all other things being equal, scientists ought to prefer simpler theories. In recent years, philosophers have argued that simpler theories make better predictions, possess theoretical virtues like explanatory power, and have other pragmatic virtues like computational tractability. However, such arguments fail to explain how and why a preference for simplicity can help one find true theories in scientific inquiry, unless one already assumes that the truth is simple. One new solution to that problem is (...) the Ockham efficiency theorem, which states that scientists who heed Ockham’s razor retract their opinions less often and sooner than do their non-Ockham competitors. The theorem neglects, however, to consider competitors following random strategies and in many applications random strategies are known to achieve better worst-case loss than deterministic strategies. In this paper, we describe two ways to extend the result to a very general class of random, empirical strategies. The first extension concerns expected retractions, retraction times, and errors and the second extension concerns retractions in chance, times of retractions in chance, and chances of errors. (shrink)

A VERSION OF CARTESIAN METHOD RODERICK H. CHISHQLM Introduction In one of his many profound discussions of the method of philosophy, Korner makes the ...

This article shares reflections from members of the community of philosophers of education in the United States and Canada who were invited to express their insights in response to the theme ‘Snaps...

There is public support in the United States and Europe for accounting for animal welfare in national policies on food and agriculture. Although an emerging body of research has measured animals’ capacity to suffer, there has been no specific attempt to analyze how this information is interpreted by the public or how exactly it should be reflected in policy. The aim of this study was to quantify Americans’ preferences about farming methods and the suffering they impose on different species to (...) generate a metric for weighing the trade-offs between different approaches of promoting animal welfare. A survey of 502 residents of the United States was implemented using the online platform Mechanical Turk. Using respondent data, we developed the species-adjusted measure of suffering-years, an analogue of the disability-adjusted life year, to calculate the suffering endured under different farming conditions by cattle, pigs, and chickens, the three most commonly consumed animals. Nearly one-third of respondents reported that they believed animal suffering should be taken into account to a degree equal to or above human suffering. The 2016 suffering burden in the United States according to two tested conditions was approximately 66 million SAMYs for pigs, 156 million SAMYs for cattle, and 1.3 billion SAMYs for chickens. This calculation lends early guidance for efforts to reduce animal suffering, demonstrating that to address the highest burden policymakers should focus first on improving conditions for chickens. (shrink)

We describe an approach that enables a more complete evaluation of the validity of emotional intelligence measures. We argue that a source of evidence for validity is often overlooked by researchers and test developers, namely, evidence based on response processes. This evidence can be obtained through a definition of the ability, a description of the mental processes that operate when a person uses the ability, the development of a theory of response behaviour that links variation in the construct with variation (...) on the responses to the items of a measure, and a test of the theory of response behaviour through one or more strategies that we describe. (shrink)

Previous works usually report greater postural stability in precise visual tasks than in stationary-gaze tasks. However, existing cognitive models do not fully support these results as they assume that performing an attention-demanding task while standing would alter postural stability because of the competition of attention between the tasks. Contrary to these cognitive models, attentional resources may increase to create a synergy between visual and postural brain processes to perform precise oculomotor behaviors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated a difficult searching (...) task and a control free-viewing task. The precise visual task required the 16 young participants to find a target in densely furnished images. The free-viewing task consisted of looking at similar images without searching anything. As expected, the participants exhibited significantly lower body displacements and a significantly higher cognitive workload in the precise visual task than in the free-viewing task. Most important, our exploration showed functional synergies between visual and postural processes in the searching task, that is, significant negative relationships showing lower head and neck displacements to reach more expended zones of fixation. These functional synergies seemed to involve a greater attentional demand because they were not significant anymore when the cognitive workload was controlled. In the free-viewing task, only significant positive relationships were found and they did not involve any change in cognitive workload. An alternative cognitive model and its potential subtended neuroscientific circuit are proposed to explain the supposedly cognitively grounded functional nature of vision–posture synergies in precise visual tasks. (shrink)

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other (...) hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). (shrink)

Political scientists have conventionally assumed that achieving democracy is a one-way ratchet. Only very recently has the question of ‘democratic backsliding’ attracted any research attention. We argue that democratic instability is best understood with tools from complexity science. The explanatory power of complexity science arises from several features of complex systems. Their relevance in the context of democracy is discussed. Several policy recommen- dations are offered to help stabilize current systems of representative democracy.

Sextus Empiricus présente le scepticisme néo-pyrrhonien comme une philosophie qui cherche la vérité (PH I, 1-3). Il est difficile de le croire, pourtant, lorsque l ’ on étudie les longues séries d ’ arguments qu ’ il met en opposition afin de produire l ’ isosthénie, la force égale des arguments, qui amène à la suspension du jugement. Comment faut-il interpréter ce qui pourrait apparaître comme un décalage entre la théorie et la pratique du scepticisme? Plutôt que de conclure à (...) l ’ inconséquence du scepticisme, (i) l ’ article se propose de reprendre à nouveaux frais les passages où Sextus présente le scepticisme comme une recherche de la vérité. Pour ce faire, il faut d ’ une part (ii) lier cette présentation à l ’ opération de différenciation entre le scepticisme de la Nouvelle Académie et celui des néo-pyrrhoniens ; d ’ autre part (iii) revenir sur la pratique du scepticisme par les néo-pyrrhoniens. Loin d ’ être une recherche de la vérité, le pyrrhonisme présenté par Sextus Empiricus recherche l ’ incertitude à l ’ origine du bonheur sceptique. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We argue that the relevance of error probabilities (...) is to ensure that only statistical hypotheses that have passed severe or probative tests are inferred from the data. The severity criterion supplies a meta-statistical principle for evaluating proposed statistical inferences, avoiding classic fallacies from tests that are overly sensitive, as well as those not sensitive enough to particular errors and discrepancies. Introduction and overview 1.1 Behavioristic and inferential rationales for Neyman–Pearson (N–P) tests 1.2 Severity rationale: induction as severe testing 1.3 Severity as a meta-statistical concept: three required restrictions on the N–P paradigm Error statistical tests from the severity perspective 2.1 N–P test T(): type I, II error probabilities and power 2.2 Specifying test T() using p-values Neyman's post-data use of power 3.1 Neyman: does failure to reject H warrant confirming H? Severe testing as a basic concept for an adequate post-data inference 4.1 The severity interpretation of acceptance (SIA) for test T() 4.2 The fallacy of acceptance (i.e., an insignificant difference): Ms Rosy 4.3 Severity and power Fallacy of rejection: statistical vs. substantive significance 5.1 Taking a rejection of H0 as evidence for a substantive claim or theory 5.2 A statistically significant difference from H0 may fail to indicate a substantively important magnitude 5.3 Principle for the severity interpretation of a rejection (SIR) 5.4 Comparing significant results with different sample sizes in T(): large n problem 5.5 General testing rules for T(), using the severe testing concept The severe testing concept and confidence intervals 6.1 Dualities between one and two-sided intervals and tests 6.2 Avoiding shortcomings of confidence intervals Beyond the N–P paradigm: pure significance, and misspecification tests Concluding comments: have we shown severity to be a basic concept in a N–P philosophy of induction? (shrink)

The issues of double-counting, use-constructing, and selection effects have long been the subject of debate in the philosophical as well as statistical literature. I have argued that it is the severity, stringency, or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine if a double-use of data is admissible. Hitchcock and Sober ([2004]) question whether this ‘severity criterion' can perform its intended job. I argue that their criticisms stem from a flawed interpretation of the severity criterion. Taking their criticism as (...) a springboard, I elucidate some of the central examples that have long been controversial, and clarify how the severity criterion is properly applied to them.1. Severity and Use-Constructing: Four Points (and Some Clarificatory Notes) 1.1. Point 1: Getting beyond ‘all or nothing’ standpoints1.2. Point 2: The rationale for prohibiting double-counting is the requirement that tests be severe1.3. Point 3: Evaluate severity of a test T by its associated construction rule R1.4. Point 4: The ease of passing vs. ease of erroneous passing: Statistical vs. ‘Definitional’ probability2. The False Dilemma: Hitchcock and Sober 2.1. Marsha measures her desk reliably2.2. A false dilemma3. Canonical Errors of Inference 3.1. How construction rules may alter the error-probing performance of tests3.2. Rules for accounting for anomalies3.3. Hunting for statistically significant differences4. Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other (...) hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). The book is beautifully edited and produced; it contains a wealth of illustrative figures, well-chosen short quotations from original sources and contemporary commentators (some longer quotations are relegated in an appendix at the end of a chapter) and does not dispense with insightful mathematical arguments in the main text (some advanced deductions are, however, relegated in the appendices). It contains nine parts, whereas only the first and the last one are exclusively devoted to philosophical issues. The seven remaining parts, each subdivided into three chapters, centre around one major episode (a theory, a world view, etc.) in the history of physics. The author presents this material in a clear and philosophically unbiased way so that also readers who do not share Cushing’s subsequent philosophical conclusions will find this inspiring book extremely useful. Part 1 (”The scientific enterprise”) discusses some traditional (”objectivist”) views concerning the status of scientific knowledge, ”the” scientific method, and the relation.... (shrink)

Can we trade in the truths we discover? We show that any public work of truth requires the assistance of three collaborators that we call the Inscriber, the Thinker and the Truthmaker. We then show that if the Inscriber can legitimately trade in his inscriptions, the Thinker should not be authorized to trade in those of his thoughts which are true: because he is not the author of their truth.

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

Discussions about a replicability crisis in science have been driven by the normative claim that all of science should be replicable and the empirical claim that most of it isn’t. Recently, such crisis talk has been challenged by a new localism, which argues a) that serious problems with replicability are not a general occurrence in science and b) that replicability itself should not be treated as a universal standard. The goal of this article is to introduce this emerging strand of (...) the debate and to discuss some of its implications and limitations. I will in particular highlight the issue of demarcation that localist accounts have to address, i.e. the question of how we can distinguish replicable science from disciplines where replicability does not apply. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The question of axiomatizability of first-order temporal logics is studied w.r.t. different semantics and several restrictions on the language. The validity problem for logics admitting flexible interpretations of the predicate symbols or allowing at least binary predicate symbols is shown to be ?1 1-complete. In contrast, it is decidable for temporal logics with rigid monadic predicate symbols but without function symbols and identity.

Conditionals pervade every aspect of our thinking, from the mundane and everyday such as ‘if you eat too much cheese, you will have nightmares’ to the most fundamental concerns as in ‘if global warming isn’t halted, sea levels will rise dramatically’. Many decades of research have focussed on the semantics of conditionals and how people reason from conditionals in everyday life. Here it has been rather overlooked how we come to such conditionals in the first place. In many cases, they (...) are learned through testimony: someone warns us about the ill-effects of cheese. Any full account of the conditional must consequently incorporate such learning. Here, we provide a new formal account of belief change in response to a testimonial conditional. (shrink)

The papers in this issue are based on presentations by the authors at the 163nd National Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seattle, Washington, 13–18 February 1997 in the session entitled Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do about Whistleblowing organized by Stephanie J. Bird and Diane Hoffman-Kim. The papers have been modified following double blind peer review.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz war der vielleicht letzte europäische Denker, der das Wissen und den gelehrten Diskurs seiner Zeit noch überblicken konnte. Dabei leitete ihn die Überzeugung, dass die Wahrheit erst in der Pluralität der Perspektiven erfahrbar werde. Dieses ebenso spannungsreiche wie produktive Verhältnis von Einheit und Pluralität erkunden die Autoren der Beiträge auf drei im Leibnizschen Werk eng miteinander verbundenen Gebieten: der Philosophie, der Theologie und dem politischen Denken. Ausgehend von den philosophischen Grundlagen wird die Theologie in Leibniz' Gesamtkonzept der (...) Wissenschaften und besonders angesichts seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der religiösen Pluralität untersucht, seine Bemühungen um die Vereinigung der christlichen Konfessionen und sein Interesse für fremde Religionen und Kulturen. Sein politisches Denken und seine politische Tätigkeit bilden den Prüfstein für die angestrebte Verbindung von Theorie und Praxis. Ein abschließender Blick gilt seiner Rezeption auf diesen Gebieten. Ein Merkmal mehrerer Beiträge ist die präzise Arbeit an Texten zu China, zur Auseinandersetzung mit Thomasius und zum ökumenischen Gespräch, die erst seit kurzem oder noch gar nicht in einer kritischen Edition vorliegen. Mit Beiträgen von: Luca Basso, Friedrich Beiderbeck, Daniel J. Cook, Nora Gädeke, Ursula Goldenbaum, Wenchao Li, Rüdiger Otto, Hans Poser, Patrick Riley, Jaime de Salas, Brigitte Saouma, Heinrich Schepers, Martin Schneider, Lloyd Strickland und Stephan Waldhoff. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology reveals two attitudes regarding the classification of phenomena. On the one hand, they are classified by type. On the other, the “banality of saturation” reduces these types topossibleinterpretations, in which case saturation isn’t a qualitative rupture anymore, but a possible hermeneutic attitude to any phenomenon. Hence, there is, in Marion’s phenomenology, a tension between a metaphysical attitude that maintains categorial discontinuities, and a hermeneutic temptation driven by the recovery of quantitative continuities between all phenomena. Yet, Marion does (...) not push this quantitative temptation to its limits; he steps back in front of a specifically saturated phenomenon: the icon. (shrink)

The issues of double-counting, use-constructing, and selection effects have long been the subject of debate in the philosophical as well as statistical literature. I have argued that it is the severity, stringency, or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine if a double-use of data is admissible. Hitchcock and Sober ([2004]) question whether this ‘severity criterion' can perform its intended job. I argue that their criticisms stem from a flawed interpretation of the severity criterion. Taking their criticism as (...) a springboard, I elucidate some of the central examples that have long been controversial, and clarify how the severity criterion is properly applied to them. Severity and Use-Constructing: Four Points (and Some Clarificatory Notes) 1.1 Point 1: Getting beyond ‘all or nothing’ standpoints 1.2 Point 2: The rationale for prohibiting double-counting is the requirement that tests be severe 1.3 Point 3: Evaluate severity of a test T by its associated construction rule R 1.4 Point 4: The ease of passing vs. ease of erroneous passing: Statistical vs. ‘Definitional’ probability The False Dilemma: Hitchcock and Sober 2.1 Marsha measures her desk reliably 2.2 A false dilemma Canonical Errors of Inference 3.1 How construction rules may alter the error-probing performance of tests 3.2 Rules for accounting for anomalies 3.3 Hunting for statistically significant differences Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

S'agissant du problème lié au statut de la connaissance humaine en général, la querelle du faillibilisme et du fondationnalisme n'est pas neuve. On peut même dire qu'elle parcourt l'histoire de la philosophie depuis ses tout débuts. Dans le contexte des préoccupations propres à la pensée contemporaine, cette querelle semble cependant se cristalliser autour de la question suivante : quel statut devons-nous aujourd'hui accorder à nos énoncés philosophiques? Pouvons-nous et devons-nous encore revendiquer pour ces énoncés, traditionnellement chargés d'établir les fondements et (...) les principes premiers, un statut ontologique, sinon transcendantal? Ou au contraire, le développement des sciences expérimentales modernes, ayant éveillé en nous de manière sans cesse plus aiguë la conscience de la précarité de nos connaissances, ne nous incite-t-il pas désormais à envisager les propositions philosophiques comme n'étant rien de plus, malgre leur prétention et leur visée, que des énoncés faillibles, relatifs à l'expérience ou à l'histoire? (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Begrundung ethischer Verbindlichkeit und der Geltung ethischer Normen steht im Zentrum der Ethik als Wissenschaft. Diese Grundfragen der Normativitat aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln zu beleuchten, ist Ziel der Beitrage dieses Bandes. Im ersten Teil werden zunachst die Grundlagen der Normativitat behandelt. Die Beitrage des zweiten Teils setzen sich mit Normativitat unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Stellung des Individuums auseinander. Der dritte Teil fasst schliesslich normative Fragen gesellschaftlicher Ordnung in den Blick, wobei auch spezifische Probleme aus den Bereichsethiken behandelt (...) werden. Der Band versammelt Essays fuhrender deutscher Ethiker, die ihre je unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Positionen in den Diskurs der Normativitat einbringen. (shrink)

"Welche Bedeutung kommt der Dimension des Leibes im Religiösen zu und mit welchen Begriffen lässt sie sich beschreiben? Zwei der aussichtsreichsten Diskurspartner in dieser Frage sind Johann Gottlieb Fichte und Emmanuel Levinas. Ihre Beiträge werden erschlossen, auf ihre philosophische Plausibilität hin befragt und in einen Dialog miteinander gebracht. Die dabei erarbeiteten Kategorien werden in ihrer grundsätzlichen Eignung für eine christlich-theologische Reflexion überprüft und exemplarisch auf zwei Praxisfelder angewendet: Eucharistie und Kontemplation."-- Back cover.

As a population, people who self‐identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender face significant risks to health and difficulty in obtaining medical and behavioral health care, relative to the general public. These issues are especially challenging in safety‐net health care institutions, which serve a range of vulnerable populations with limited access, limited options, and significant health disparities. Safety‐net hospitals, particularly public hospitals with fewer resources than academic medical centers and other nonprofit hospitals that also serve as safety nets, are under (...) immense financial pressures. However, with the introduction in 2011 of standards for LGBT inclusion by The Joint Commission, showing progress on LGBT health care has become a compliance issue for hospitals. And because the health care community itself has contributed to LGBT health disparities through prejudice, disrespect, or inadequate knowledge that have made it difficult for LGB and especially T people to seek care or to obtain the care they need, there is a moral case for allocating scarce resources to this population: we owe them some investment in righting wrongs that the health care system itself has produced.So, where to begin in the typical safety‐net hospital or clinic? Beyond staff training, which is essential and for which good models now exist, what does justice demand from a service‐utilization perspective? Given the range of health care services that an LGBT person in the safety net may need or want, how should we set priorities? And what can't we promise to do for this member of our community? (shrink)

Abstract : That paper proposes an interpretation of the kantian theory of I-thoughts and self-knowledge. We show that Kant has admitted the humean theory of the elusiveness of the Self, but that he hasn’t endorse a “no-owner theory”. He has argued in favor of the apriority of the « I think ». We scrutinize how that conception can be applied to some varieties of ordinary I-thoughts and stress upon its difficulties.

La fuite des cerveaux est-elle un phénomène individuellement légitime, mais socialement fâcheux ou bien enveloppe-t-elle une forme d’injustice à l’égard des populations qui en subissent les effets ? Nous construisons un modèle simplifié de ce phénomène permettant de faire apparaître ce qu’il y a d’éthiquement problématique dans la fuite des cerveaux et quels types de remèdes pourraient y être apportés.

Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis aufeinanderfolgender Theorien rückte spätestens mit der Publikation von T. S. Kuhns einflußreicher Schrift Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen im Jahre 1961 in den Brennpunkt wissenschaftsphilosophischer Untersuchungen. Dabei gibt es im wesentlichen zwei große Lager. Auf der einen Seite stehen Philosophen wie P. Feyerabend und T. S. Kuhn selbst, die den Aspekt der Diskontinuität...

An ethical evaluation of employee participation to decision-making has to be based, obviously, on a theory about ethics, but also on an understanding of the role and the impact of participation in the organisation. This paper aims at sketching different organisational paradigms, and analysing their normative prescriptions w.r.t. participation. It will appear that the recognition of the social nature of man and the acknowledgement of the existence of differentiated goals could enhance the positive outcomes of participation. Next, we will examine (...) to what extent a systemic approach and a stakeholder concept of the firm can meet these requirements. The necessity of a global approach to participation will be emphasised. Consequently, we suggest in the last section of this paper that participation should be extended to the definition of a shared value horizon. (shrink)

Many authors recently tried to show that markets don't have tobe based on morals as ordering principles. This paper intends to elaborate on two missing aspects in this debate: Firstly, a well-founded critique of this thesis traces back to Durkheim and Parsons. Their arguments on these critical points will bring new insights into the debate of how order is established. Secondly, many authors Iimit their studies to simple game theory-based arguments and on reflections on plausibility conceming the power of the (...) state to enforce the law without explaining steps and conditions for the evidence of the suggested processes. This papertri es to fill some of these gaps; it will show that there are good arguments for real markets based on law and especially on morals to reach a high Ievel of division of labour. (shrink)

Dondeyne, A. Pluriformiteit en eenheid van de filosofie.--Peperzak, A. Wegwijzers naar een dialogiek?--Boer, T. de. De eindigheid van de mens en de oneindigheid van de waarheid.--Hollak, J. Wijsgerige reflecties over de scheppingsidee : St. Thomas, Hegel en de Grieken.--Plat, J. Kants kritiek op de rationele psychologie.--Melsen, A. van. Wijsgerige antropologie en de ontwikkeling van natuurwetenschap en techniek.--Buytendijk, F. Het pathisch aspect van de eindigheid.--Struyker Boudier, H. 's Bergbeklimmers einder.

It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...) concept of belief. In contrast, it appears that no similar constraint applies when we deliberate about emotions. Indeed, I argue that extrinsic norms are suf ficient to understand thoroughly the normativity of emotions. Therefore, the postulation of intrinsic norms or correctness conditions seems unmotivated. Worse, if emotions had intrinsic norms or correctness conditions, they would manifest themselves when we wonder whether an emotion is appropriate in this or that context. But they don’t. (shrink)

The unequal wealth of nations doesn’t suffice to license an application of the principles of distributive justice to the world at large, for nations are not situated in the “circumstances of distributive justice”. We propose an intuitive analysis of these circumstances in order to manifest the disanalogy between domestic and global level in the theory of justice.

Résumé — Au début du traité Della ragione di Stato, Boreto déclare son opposition résolue au machiavélisme. Il récuse en effet une conception de la raison d’État fondée sur l’immoralisme, sur la transgression répétée des commandements divins. Mais Botero ne prône pas un simple retour à une fondation théologique du politique. Il reprend plutôt à son compte, sous le nom de raison d’État, une conception du politique délivrée de toute relation à la moralité transcendante venue de Dieu, une conception amorale (...) telle que Machiavel l’envisageait déjà. Et dans cette perspective il introduit la distinction entre raison d’État ordinaire et raison d’État extraordinaire et prétend montrer de quelle manière une raison d’État ordinaire, pourtant conduite par le seul désir de domination, peut employer des moyens tout à fait compatibles avec les exigences de la morale chrétienne.— At the beginning of the treatise Della ragione di Stato, Botero claims his determined opposition to Machiavellism. He impugns any notion of the reason of State that would be based on immorality, that is on constant transgression of God’s prescriptions. But Botero doesn’t advocate the return to a theological foundation of politics. He uses the expression ragione di Stato to denote a notion of politics released from every relation to transcendent morality coming from God, an amoral notion that Machiavelli was already contemplating. In this matter, it is necessary to distinguish the ordinary from the extraordinary reason of State, because Botero shows how an ordinary reason of State, even looking for the only domination, is able to work in a way which is in full accordance with Christian morality. (shrink)

​Nach der Auffassung Thomas S. Kuhns ist in einer wissenschaftlichen Disziplin, die einen bestimmten Reifegrad erreicht hat, stets genau ein Paradigma vorherrschend, welches die normalwissenschaftliche Entwicklung bestimmt. In diesem Sammelband wird untersucht, ob im Widerspruch zu Kuhn Paradigmenkonstellationen existieren, in denen mehrere Paradigmen über einen langen Zeitraum parallel existieren und unterschiedliche, sich z.T. widersprechende Erklärungsmuster für dieselben Gegenstandsbereiche bereitstellen. Zu diesem Zweck haben die Herausgeber Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler der Soziologie, Physik, Musikpädagogik, Erziehungs-, Politik-, Sprach-, Kultur- und Sportwissenschaft eingeladen, die Paradigmenstrukturen (...) ihrer Wissenschaften anhand eines einheitlichen Begriffsapparates zu analysieren. Es stellt sich heraus, dass sich Kuhns Position als nicht adäquat erweist und durch ein differenzierteres Wissenschaftsverständnis abgelöst werden muss. (shrink)

Die Elementarteilchenphysik gilt weithin als eine Teildisziplin der Physik, die ein reduktionistisches Programm par excellence verfolgt. In dieser Arbeit soll versucht werden, unter Berücksichtigung einer Analyse neuerer Methoden der Elementarteilchenphysik, die Berechtigung dieser Behauptung zu klären. Die Reduktionismusproblemtik läßt sich in ontologische, epistemologische und methodologische Aspekte untergliedern.

Just like humans, animals experience pleasure and pain. Animals can be intelligent, curious, and social, but they can't speak for themselves. So, activists speak out for those that lack basic necessities and suffer mistreatment.

Nach einem kurzen, kritischen Bericht über die Gründe, die Brentano zur Ablehnung der mathematischen Logik bewogen, wird gezeigt, daß seine Analyse der logischen Urteilsformen sich in einem finiten Untersystem der exakten Prädikatenlogik interpretieren läßt. Es wird sodann ausgeführt, daß dieses logische System auch zur Formulierung seiner Relationstheorie geeignet ist - sofern man von der Kontinualrelation absieht. Dieser wird aber durch eine Erweiterung der Prädikatenlogik durch inexakte Prädikate genügegetan. Schließlich wird erklärt, wie Brentanos Auffassung der logischen Modalitäten als Urteilsmodi in diesem (...) logischen System ausgedrückt werden kann. Eine kurze Nachbemerkung gilt dem Verständnis zwischen Brentanos Ontologie und der von ihr angeregten logischen Theorie. (shrink)

Nach einem kurzen, kritischen Bericht über die Gründe, die Brentano zur Ablehnung der mathematischen Logik bewogen, wird gezeigt, daß seine (spätere) Analyse der logischen Urteilsformen sich in einem finiten Untersystem der exakten Prädikatenlogik interpretieren läßt. Es wird sodann ausgeführt, daß dieses logische System auch zur Formulierung seiner Relationstheorie geeignet ist - sofern man von der Kontinualrelation absieht. Dieser wird aber durch eine Erweiterung der Prädikatenlogik durch inexakte Prädikate genügegetan. Schließlich wird erklärt, wie Brentanos Auffassung der logischen Modalitäten als Urteilsmodi in (...) diesem logischen System ausgedrückt werden kann. Eine kurze Nachbemerkung gilt dem Verständnis zwischen Brentanos Ontologie und der von ihr angeregten logischen Theorie. (shrink)